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NOTES
Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws and the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service
Are The Swiss To Blame For Tax Dollars That The U.S.
Internal Revenue Service Cannot Collect When U.S. Citizens
"Hide" Their Money In Swiss Banks?
To an American the thought of Swiss banks conjures up ideas of bank
accounts registered to numbers instead of names, safe deposit boxes
full of gold, and international wealth hidden behind the bank secrecy
laws of a tiny country. Switzerland offers many advantages to the finan-
cially minded person in search of a unique capital market: a stable, freely
convertible, sound currency; well-organized financial institutions in a
neutral country; and a highly developed international communications
and transportation market in a multi-lingual society.1 The same bank
secrecy provisions that make Switzerland so attractive to the investor
serve to plague the U.S. Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").2
This Note will review the bank secrecy laws of Switzerland and the
United States, the agreements between them that attempt to prevent the
criminal use of Swiss banks, and the tax system used by the Swiss Gov-
ernment to prevent Swiss citizens from evading Swiss taxes by the use of
their own bank secrecy laws. In addition, this Note will demonstrate
that the United States is responsible for creating a treaty that permits its
citizens to evade taxes by banking in Switzerland.
1 Buzescu, Foreign Bank Operations in Switzerland, 19 INT'L L. 897, 899 (1985). See also H.
MEYER SWISS CAPITAL MARKETS 2 (1983).
2 The United States taxes its citizens based on their world wide income, when this income is
hidden from the IRS the U.S. government is not able to tax it.
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I. BANKING LAWS IN SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Secrecy in Swiss Banking
1. Pre-Statute Financial Information Protection
"Swiss banking," in the minds of the American public, brings with it
many misconceptions. Principal in these misconceptions are the ideas
that every Swiss bank account is issued to a number instead of a person's
name and that it is this numbering process which provides the "secrecy."
Only a small percentage of all Swiss bank accounts are registered to
a number. A numbered account is granted when the depositor is an es-
tablished customer and can justify to a senior bank official the need for
the number instead of the name on the account. Numbered accounts are
commonly reserved for persons who have a name that would be easily
recognized and so would attract unwanted attention from bank
employees.3
There are no purely anonymous bank accounts in Switzerland. At
least one bank official has access to the name of the party holder of each
account.' Numbered accounts do not receive any special treatment and
the secrecy of the information in a numbered Swiss bank account is no
more carefully maintained than the secrecy of any other bank account in
the country of Switzerland.' The only time an account can be main-
tained without at least one person in the bank knowing the identity of the
depositor is when the account is maintained by a special Swiss agent.6
Prior to 1934 there were no statutes regulating the Swiss banking
industry.7 Bank secrecy was implied from "personality rights" which
had been protected by the courts.' Later, courts implied a contract of
confidentiality between the banker and the client.9 The first statutory
protection of the privacy rights of Swiss citizens was approved in article
28 of the Swiss Civil Code in December 1907.
3 Rushford, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on Insider Trading, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 547, 548 (1984).
4 Honegger, Demystification of Swiss Banking Secrecy, 9 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 5
(1983).
5 Id. at 4.
6 If a customer to a Swiss bank is represented by an agent who is a Swiss lawyer, notary, or
member of a Swiss trust or auditing company, the agent does not need to identify the name of the
principal to the bank. In this situation the Swiss bank depends on the agent's verification that the
money is legally acquired. Honegger, supra note 4, at 8. It is recently reported that the Swiss Bank-
ing Commission has recommended that this policy, of permitting a Swiss agent to be named on the
account, no longer be allowed. W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD, 24.1
(1987).
7 Raifman, Effects of US/Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
565, 571 (1983).
8 Honegger, supra note 4, at 2.
9 Raifman, supra note 7, at 571.
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Swiss laws of agency have also been used to protect financial infor-
mation by imposing a duty of loyalty upon banks as agents of the cus-
tomer. This duty does not depend on an express agreement. 10
a. Swiss Penal Code
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code makes it a crime to release fi-
nancial information about a client to a foreign party. The Code supports
bank secrecy in two other articles. Article 162 makes it a crime to dis-
close information that a party has a contractual obligation to protect,
and article 159 makes it a crime to disclose freely any information when
such a disclosure impairs a client's resources. 1'
b. Swiss Bank Secrecy Act
The Bank Secrecy Act, first approved in 1934, was the first set of
Swiss statutes created to fortify bank secrecy. This Act was promulgated
because of the lack of confidence in world banking which followed the
Great Depression and the failure of a significant Geneva bank. It was
also enacted to protect the Jews from an influx of the Nazi regime that
attempted to acquire the private assets of German Jews who held ac-
counts in Swiss banks. The Act was an ex officio statute which mandated
the government to protect an individual's privacy rights.12
Under Swiss private law the right of protection of financial secrecy
is owned by the depositor, not by the bank. a Article 4714 of the Bank
Secrecy Act makes it illegal for a bank employee to disclose a secret en-
trusted to the bank and it broadens the scope of penalties to which a
banker may be subjected for failure to protect the information.15
10 Rushford, supra note 3, at 546.
11 Raifman, supra note 7, at 571.
12 Id. at 572.
13 Id. at 575.
14 Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law states:
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer, employee,
mandatory liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as a representative of the Banking Com-
mission, officer or employee of a recognized auditing company, or who has become aware
of such a secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate professional
secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months or by a fine not
exceeding 50,000.00 francs.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine not exceed-
ing 30,000.00 francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termination of
the official or employment relationship or the exercise of the profession.
4. Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to testify and to fur-
nish information to a government authority shall remain reserved.
See Honegger, supra note 4, at 4; See also Bundesgesetz fiber die Banken und Sparkassen of Nov. 8,
1934, as amended by Federal Law of Mar. 1, 1971.
15 See generally Raifman, supra note 7, at 572.
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If a bank inappropriately releases information, the bank may be
found criminally liable under the Swiss Penal Code. Such action may
also create a civil liability. A bank customer may prove a tort action (or
an action for breach of contract) by establishing that: 1) damages were
sustained as a result of the banker's disclosure; and, 2) the disclosure was
willful or negligent on the part of the banker (or the banker breached the
implied contractual duty of non-disclosure); and, 3) the release of infor-
mation was the proximate cause of the damages; and, 4) there was no
legal provision or waiver by the client serving to legalize the disclosure. 6
However, bank secrecy is not a right without exceptions.
2. Exceptions to Swiss Bank Secrecy
The general rule is that a banker in Switzerland can refuse to pro-
vide tax information to the tax authorities of any country.1 7 The excep-
tion to this rule is when a taxpayer falsifies documents in order to
mislead the Swiss revenue service (the Federal Tax Administration or
"FTA"). With this falsification of documents, the crime rises from sim-
ple tax evasion to the level of tax fraud.'8 In three cantons 9 tax fraud is
considered a "crime" and thus criminal procedure will cause the bank
secrecy to be annulled.2'
Besides criminal proceedings, which may include tax fraud, bank
secrecy exceptions may be created three other ways. First, a client may
consent to the release of information. For example, a client may be re-
quired to consent to release of information when securing a bank loan
from another bank in another country or when applying for the right to
use other branches of the same bank in another country.2' Second, civil
family law proceedings will permit a person who has the legal obligation
to manage the property of another to acquire information about that
party's assets. Heirs will also be given access to the estate information.22
Third, certain public law limitations, including debt execution and bank-
ruptcy proceedings, may require that bank information be divulged.2 3
B. Secrecy in U.S. Banking
Secrecy in banking has not been safeguarded in the United States.
16 Honegger, supra note 4, at 3.
17 Id. at 7.
18 Id.; see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
19 In the cantons of Zurich, Geneva and Basel. A canton is a Swiss governmental unit similar
to a state. There are 26 cantons in Switzerland. BIANCHI, TAx MANAGEMENT FOREIGN INCOME
PORTFOLIO A-i (1986).
20 Honegger, supra note 4, at 7.
21 Buzescu, supra note 1, at 910.
22 Rushford, supra note 3, at 548.
23 Honegger, supra note 4, at 5.
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Legislation against bank secrecy appeared in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy
Act ("BSA").2 4 Congress enacted the BSA with its power under the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution."5 The BSA authorizes the
Treasury Department to require financial institutions in the United
States to keep certain records of financial transactions.2 6 These records
are designed to reveal white collar and organized crime activities by serv-
ing as a paper trail to be used to track money currents. The BSA was a
unilateral attempt by Congress designed to make it impossible to move
large amounts of money anonymously between U.S. banks and the banks
of other countries.27
U.S. banks must abide by the record keeping and reporting require-
ments of the BSA. Prior to this act, only the transactions which were
considered "unusual" were reported to the Treasury Department 8 and
this reporting was on a voluntary basis.2 9
The BSA is divided into two titles:
Title I requirements are broadly stated in statutory form, and are
specified in the Code of Federal Regulations. Financial institutions are
required to record all major currency or extension of credit transac-
tions. The identity of any person having a financial interest in foreign
accounts must also be recorded. The regulations seek to set up record-
ing systems for tracing all large deposits for up to two years. Thus, the
institutions must copy the front and back of checks in excess of 100
dollars. Each financial item transaction of more than 10,000 dollars
that is remitted or transferred to a person, account, or place outside of
the United States must also be recorded. This requirement includes
recordation of checks or drafts in excess of 10,000 dollars drawn or
issued by a foreign bank which a domestic bank has paid or presented
for payment. These regulations also extend to certificates of deposit.
The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of each pur-
chaser of a certificate must be recorded along with a description of the
instrument, including the manner and date of payment. The regula-
tions impose additional requirements for casinos, as well as brokers
and dealers in securities. Title I records are to be kept for a period of
five years.
Title II of the Act requires financial institutions to report directly
to the Secretary certain domestic and foreign currency transactions.
Like the BSA record-keeping requirements, the reporting provisions
24 12 U.S.C. 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1982); 31 U.S.C. 5311-5322 (1982), amended by 31
U.S.C. 5316(a), 5317 (b)-(c), 5323 (West Supp. 1985).
25 Comment, The Bank Secrecy Act: Privacy, Comity, and The Politics of Contraband, 11 N.C.
J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 667, 668 (1986).
26 Id.
27 4 REDDEN, MODERN LEGAL SYsrEMs CYCLOPEDIA 347 (1984).
28 Comment, supra note 25, at 672.
29 Id.
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are premised on the congressional finding of their usefulness in com-
batting criminal activity and are specified by regulation.
Domestic financial institutions are required to report the pay-
ment, receipt, or transfer of currency in excess of 10,000 dollars....
(citations omitted)30
Constitutional challenges to the BSA have been unsuccessful. Theo-
ries advanced to test the BSA include substantive due process, first
amendment, fourth amendment, and fifth amendment. 31 Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to find a protected privacy interest in banking
records.32 The Court held that Treasury Department access to private
banking records without customer notification is not an unreasonable
search and seizure.
33
In an attempt to protect a privacy interest for the bank depositor in
the United States (the BSA has received strong constitutional support
from the courts), Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978 ("RFPA").3 4 The RFPA does not grant any enforceable right of
privacy to an individual but does place a legal procedural requirement
upon a federal agency wanting to access a bank depositor's account infor-
mation. Before the agency can have access to the information it must
provide any one of the following: a formal written agency request, a
grand jury subpoena, a judicial subpoena, an administrative subpoena or
summons, a search warrant, or a customer authorization. The customer
must have proper notice before any information is disclosed.3 5
U.S. banking laws do not provide any secrecy of financial informa-
tion to the customer. 36 They only create procedural requirements the
federal agency must comply with in order to access the financial records.
30 Id. at 673-74.
31 Id. at 678.
32 California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
33 Id. at 23. See Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
34 Comment, supra note 25, at 680.
35 This Note also advises that "proper notice" requires the customer to be provided with a list
of the records to be disclosed and advice on how this disclosure can be judicially challenged. Id. at
680-81.
36 The U.S. Postal Service also does not provide for much privacy. In United States v. Leo-
nard, the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals rejected an "unreasonable search" argument in a
constitutional challenge when Leonard was charged with tax evasion. He was discovered when the
U.S. Post Office photocopied the front and back of envelopes arriving in the United States from
Switzerland without return addresses. The IRS compared the postmark cancellations to those of
Swiss banks and assumed they were bank statements being mailed to "secret" customers. United
States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2nd Cir. 1975).
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II. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
SWITZERLAND ATrEMPTING TO PROHIBIT CRIMINAL USE
OF Swiss BANKS
The United States and Switzerland have entered two agreements in
an attempt to limit the criminal use of Swiss banks. These are the U.S.-
Swiss Mutual Assistance Treaty and the Memorandum of
Understanding.
A. The U.S.-Swiss Mutual Assistance Treaty
The 1973 U.S.-Swiss Mutual Assistance Treaty ("MAT") was en-
acted to combat organized crime. In certain circumstances, this treaty
grants the U.S. government access to private Swiss banking records.
Pursuant to the MAT, the Swiss can disclose otherwise secret informa-
tion when the United States is investigating a serious crime, provided the
United States has already made a reasonable but unsuccessful attempt to
obtain the information. 7
This treaty was more than four years in the making. It has been
reported that one of the factors causing this long delay to a compromise
was that "Switzerland wanted a comprehensive agreement covering all
aspects of judicial assistance equivalent to the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 38 The United States wanted to
lift the Swiss banking secrecy, especially where tax violations, securities
law offenses and organized crime were prosecuted. '39
After the treaty was implemented it became obvious that it was not
effective at dealing with the criminal activities associated with insider
trading.' There were too many loopholes in the treaty and the legally
counselled were able to escape prosecution.
By 1977 the Swiss banking industry realized it would need to pro-
vide more organized assistance in the prevention and prosecution of eco-
nomic crimes in order to protect its reputation. The Swiss Bankers'
Association, the Swiss National Bank, and the other banks of Switzer-
land wrote a private agreement containing a plan to deal with this prob-
lem. The pact was called the Agreement on the Observance of Care in
Accepting Funds and the Practice of Banking Secrecy ("Agreement"). It
was signed July 1977 and was updated October 1982. Nearly every bank
voluntarily signed the Agreement. 41
37 Comment, supra note 25, at 690.
38 See infra pt. III.
39 Honegger, supra note 4, at 14; see also Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implica-
tions in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 18, 64 (1978).
40 Comment, supra note 25, at 690.
41 Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic Law, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 273, 282 (1984).
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The Agreement had three principal objectives: a) to prevent Swiss
bank use for illegally acquired funds by requiring the verification of de-
positors, b) to prevent illegal use of safe deposit boxes, and c) to prevent
tax evasion.42 This Agreement still allows a depositor to be represented
by a Swiss agent,43 but the agents now must sign a declaration that they
personally know the principal and that these funds are not in opposition
to the Agreement.44
When a U.S. district court declared sanctions against a Swiss bank
for not providing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
with the names of its customers, the Swiss became interested in providing
more assistance in the prevention of insider trading. In SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana ("BSI"), the court ordered a Swiss bank to dis-
close the identity of purchasers of stock and issued sanctions for any non-
compliance.45 The SEC needed the identity of the stock purchasers to
investigate an insider trading scheme. The judge, in determining whether
the identity must be provided by the Swiss bank, balanced the U.S. inter-
est in having integrity in the U.S. securities markets against the Swiss
interest to enforce its banking secrecy laws. The judge concluded that
the U.S. interests were greater. The bank asked its clients to waive their
own rights to Swiss bank secrecy. The information was provided and the
Swiss bank was not prosecuted.46
This pressure on the Swiss banking industry compelled the Swiss
into action. The influence of the Swiss banking industry on the U.S. fi-
nancial markets should not be underestimated. Swiss banks engage in
forty percent of the foreign bank transactions that occur in U.S. securi-
ties markets. 47 Foreign bank transactions have been reported to be nine
percent of the market volume.48
The Swiss, in an effort to deal with the problems of insider trading,
invited the United States to Bern, Switzerland in March 1982. The Swiss
brought to the table the Agreement they had created within the Swiss
banking community. In August 1982, after a series of negotiations, the
two delegations signed an understanding as to how they would handle
future insider trading problems that involved Swiss banks as buying
agents on the U.S. stock exchanges. The document is called the Memo-
randum of Understanding.49
42 Id. at 283.
43 DIAMOND, supra note 7.
44 Aubert, supra note 41, at 283.
45 SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. Ill (1981) [hereinafter BSI].
46 REDDEN, supra note 27, at 349.
47 Honegger, supra note 4, at 22.
48 Comment, supra note 25, at 670.
49 Honegger, supra note 4, at 22.
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B. The Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is not a treaty and
has not been approved by the U.S. Senate or by the Swiss Parliament. As
such it is not binding. It does declare the intent of both parties to coop-
erate in investigations of insider trading.50 The MOU guarantees Swiss
cooperation in SEC investigations even though there is no similar crime
in Switzerland.51
The MOU declared that investigations by the SEC would be consid-
ered criminal investigations as opposed to administrative investigations.
This designation inferred that the MAT would apply and provide mutual
assistance in cases of insider trading. The MOU acknowledged that the
Swiss do not have specific laws against insider trading but listed Swiss
Penal Code violations that would be considered appropriate for prosecut-
ing such activities. The MOU clarified the Swiss presumption that infor-
mation released for a specific use was restricted to that use, and made the
information released available to certain U.S. administrative and judicial
proceedings. 2
III. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SWISS AND OTHER EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES TO PREVENT THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL
BORDERS TO AVOID PROSECUTION
The Members of the Council of Europe signed the European Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters on April 20, 1959.
The purpose of this Convention was to achieve greater unity among the
members of the organization in assisting the investigation of criminal
matters. Under the general provisions of the Convention:
Art.2 Assistance may be refused:
(a) if the request concerns an offence which the requested Party
considers a political offence, an offence connected with a political of-
fence, or a fiscal offence (emphasis added);5 3
50 Raifman, supra note 7.
51 The biggest loophole in the use of the MAT alone was, that for the MAT to apply, the
information sought had to be used for what would be recognized as a crime in Switzerland. Insider
trading in Switzerland is not a crime.
52 Navickas, Swiss Banks & Insider Trading in the US., 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 159, 178
(1984). The terms of the MOU were implemented by Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion. This private agreement states that a Swiss bank will disclose the alleged insider trading infor-
mation only when the transaction occurred within 25 trading days of the public announcement of
the proposed business activity. Szak, International Cooperation in Insider Trading, 40 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1149, 1169 (1983).
53 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 13, 1957 at 284,
Europ. T.S. No. 30, contained in European Conventions and Agreements Vol. 1 (1971).
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The member states of the Council of Europe made a supplement to this
Convention in March 1978. The Convention was amended to read:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties shall not exercise the right provided for
in Article 2(a) of the Convention to refuse assistance solely on the
ground that the request concerns an offence which the requested Party
considers a fiscal offence.
Article 2
2. The request may not be refused on the ground that the law of
the requested Party does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or
does not contain a tax, duty, customs and exchange regulation of the
same kind as the law of the requesting Party.54
This change in the Convention now provides for a signatory country
to ask another signatory country for assistance in collecting information
that could lead to a tax violation, e.g., fiscal offense." Now, no other
crime than tax evasion must be committed before the members of this
Convention can request other member countries to provide them with
information necessary to prosecute the party for the crime.
IV. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE
TO PREVENT
"[The] white collar crimes of tax evasion, money laundering, and
securities fraud substantially impact on the U.S. economy. '" 56 When
asked by the U.S. Congress, the Commissioner of the IRS said, "We
can't say with any real precision any more than others can as to the
precise amount of tax revenue that is being lost through these things, but
it is simply clear that the amounts are in the multiple of billions of
dollars."57
A. Money Laundering
[The drug] trafficker is often confronted with an enormous physi-
cal obstacle in evading the detection of law enforcement officials: the
volume of currency in small denominations outweighs the volume of
any drug the trafficker smuggles into the United States. To safely reap
the rewards of his illegal gain, the trafficker must clandestinely trans-
form his illegal cash proceeds into a form of wealth that is capable of
54 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Mar. 17, 1978 at 2, Europ. T.S. No. 99 (1978).
55 The signatories of the Convention include the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Switzer-
land. Id.
56 Comment, supra note 25.
57 Weiland, Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in US., 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1115, 1117 (1984).
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use and enjoyment. This entire process is commonly referred to as
"laundering." 58
The IRS is confronted with two significant problems in attempting
to deter "money laundering." First, the nations that have secrecy laws to
protect depositors possess banking industries and other related financial
services industries. These nations recognize that if they do not provide
secrecy to their customers, their customers will seek out another country
that does provide secrecy. Most countries that provide secrecy believe
that they are handling "clean" money and that they have provisions to
prevent the use of their banks by criminals. Tax haven countries claim
no responsibility to aid other countries in their attempts to collect taxes.
Second, when hundreds of billions of dollars each day are passed in inter-
national financial transactions, the millions of dollars in the money laun-
dering processes go unnoticed. 9
B. Insider Trading
Insider trading is the act of buying or selling publicly held securities
while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the future
of those securities or the corporations those securities represent.' Inter-
national participation in the buying and selling of securities in the U.S.
markets has dramatically increased.61 Part of this increase is attributable
to foreign investment. Swiss banks, acting as agents, trade on U.S. secur-
ities markets in the name of their institution. They do not reveal the
name of their customer, who is the principal in these purchases.62 This
practice makes investigations into insider trading by the SEC very diffi-
cult. Persons with "insider" knowledge have been able to buy securities
through a Swiss bank and hide from the SEC behind the Swiss bank
secrecy laws.
This activity has been challenged by the SEC. The court in BSI had
the opportunity to rule on a motion to compel discovery and to force a
Swiss bank to answer interrogatories concerning the undisclosed parties
the bank had represented. 3 The §EC alleged insider trading on the part
of the principals represented by the bank. The bank had purchased corn-
58 Horowitz, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics Profits, 20
TEX. INT'L L. J. 135, 136 (1985). This article, citing the Crime & Secrecy Hearings, 98th Cong. 1st
Sess. 185 (1983), notes that $1 billion worth of marijuana weighs two tons and $1 billion worth of
$100 bills weighs ten tons.
59 Nadelmanne, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 33, 72
(1986).
60 H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 21, n. 33, reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2293.
61 Szak, supra note 52, at 1149.
62 Rushford, supra note 3, at 541-42.
63 BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 111.
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mon stock and call options on common stock of St. Joes Corporation
immediately prior to a cash tender offer by Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. This transaction led to a large profit for the bank's principal.
In considering whether to impose sanctions when a foreign law pro-
hibits disclosure of information, the court acknowledged the dicta in So-
ciete Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers which provided for sanctions when a party uses foreign
law to evade American law." The BSI court held that "compelling the
complete discovery demanded is not only justified in the instant case but
required to preserve our vital national interest in maintaining the integ-
rity of the securities markets against violations committed and/or aided
and assisted by parties located abroad."65 This case caused the Swiss to
initiate the meetings leading to the MOU.66
C. Tax Evasion
Off shore bank secrecy is also a haven of the tax evader. Even if
account secrecy is pierced and the depositor's identity revealed, a suc-
cessful prosecution will not reach the assets housed in the foreign ac-
count. For the IRS, it is a no win situation further complicated by the
high costs associated with unsuccessful investigation and litigation.67
A U.S. citizen is taxed on worldwide income.68 Whenever a U.S. citizen
is able to have capital assets in a foreign country and can prevent the IRS
from gaining knowledge of those assets, the taxpayer is able to evade
taxes. The taxpayer's success at avoiding taxes is dependent on the tax
liabilities created by having the capital in the country involved.
When a U.S. individual invests in a foreign country and earns in-
come, that income may be subject to taxes levied by that country and
then additional taxes levied by the U.S. Government. In an attempt to
avoid "double taxation" of U.S. citizens, such an investor is given a "for-
eign tax credit" to the extent that the income would be taxed in the
United States.6 9 When the foreign country's tax exceeds the equivalent
U.S. tax, the individual is not able to benefit by claiming a tax refund
from the U.S. Government. °
In practice, investors should only be interested in sheltering money
in a tax haven where the local taxes are significantly less than the
64 Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958).
65 BS1, 92 F.R.D. at 112.
66 Rushford, supra note 3, at 561.
67 Comment, supra note 25, at 671-72.
68 I.R.C. § 61 (1986).
69 I.R.C. § 901 (1986).
70 I.R.C. § 904 (1986).
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equivalent income tax in the United States.71 The exception to this will
be the investor who has an otherwise criminal intent such as money laun-
dering or insider trading.72 For the criminal, the secrecy provided will be
so important that the added cost of taxes or sanctions may not be a deter-
rent.73 Switzerland is not a "tax haven" if one considers a tax haven to
be a place where there are no taxes. Switzerland only becomes a "tax
haven" when the citizens of one country are able to avoid paying taxes in
their country by having their money "hidden" in a Swiss bank. In this
way individuals are able to hide their (perhaps criminally acquired) in-
come from their own country's taxing authorities.
V. How THE Swiss PREVENT THEIR OWN CITIZENS FROM
EVADING SWISS INCOME TAXES
Taxes in Switzerland are levied by the cantons.' 4 The cantons de-
cide who will be taxed. In Switzerland all corporations and all persons
are subject to cantonal taxes75 which include federal, cantonal and mu-
nicipal taxes.7 6
Swiss residents are taxed on their worldwide income and have un-
limited tax liability.77 Interest paid to a Swiss resident by a foreign
source is taxed in Switzerland. Interest that is received in a foreign cur-
rency must be converted to Swiss francs for taxation, and the rate of
exchange is determined by the rate of exchange on the date that the inter-
est payment became due.7" The Swiss, with few exceptions, receive no
foreign tax credit unless it is expressly provided for by a treaty between
Switzerland and the country that is the source of the income.79
Swiss tax authorities are not able to pierce the Swiss banking secrecy
laws to collect and assess their own taxes.80 They have confronted this
problem by creating an "anticipatory tax" (a withholding tax) on all in-
come derived from capital, e.g., interest from banks and bonds, divi-
dends, and cash lottery prizes." The stated purpose of this anticipatory
71 Finn & Pouschine, Luxembourg: Color it Green, FoRBs, Apr. 20, 1987, at 42.
72 The Swiss are cooperating more to control these criminal activities, they appreciate that
permitting these activities to occur serves only to harm the credibility of the Swiss banking industry.
73 In Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983) the court upheld a $50,000 per day sanction for failure of a foreign banking corpo-
ration, which was hiding behind bank secrecy laws, to comply with a grand jury subpoena.
74 See supra note 19.
75 REDDEN, supra note 27, at 299.
76 DELorrrE, HASKINS & SELLS, 4 INTERNATIONAL TAX AND BusINEss SERVICE 24-5
(1985).
77 Id. at 4.
78 1 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, WORLD TAX SERIES 708 (1976).
79 Id. See also DELOITE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 76, at 25.
80 REDDEN, supra note 27, at 346.
81 FOREIGN TAX LAW ASSOC., TAX LAWS OF THE WORLD, SWITZERLAND, 49 (1988).
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tax authorized by the Swiss Federal Council's Ordinance of September 1,
1943 and Ordinance No. 1 of the Federal Department of Finance and
Customs of November 20, 19442 is to prevent tax evasion. 3
The anticipatory tax must be withheld by the payor of the income
and is paid directly to the Confederation.14 The anticipatory tax rate is a
standard thirty-five percent.85 So, the payor of interest, for example, will
pay sixty-five percent of the interest income to the party who deposited
the money in the bank and will pay thirty-five percent of the interest
income to the FTA. This is done periodically." This anticipatory tax
must be withheld regardless of whether the party earning the interest is
an individual or corporation and regardless of whether foreign or
domestic.87
Even though this tax is withheld, the Swiss resident still must report
the income to be taxed. 8  If a Swiss taxpayer refuses to complete tax
declaration forms, the taxpayer can be taxed to the complete discretion
of the Revenue authorities.89
In the case of foreigners who earn interest income in Switzerland,
this anticipatory tax commonly becomes the sole and final tax.9 0 When
the income to a non-resident alien is subject to a tax treaty the party can
invoke the treaty by simply applying for a tax refund. This tax refund is
requested by completing a tax refund form for the FTA.9 1 In the case of
a U.S. citizen who is not a resident of Switzerland, the U.S.-Swiss Con-
vention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation92 ("Double Tax Treaty")
permits the Swiss Government to withhold the thirty-five percent antici-
patory tax but then requires that the Swiss Government refund all but
five percent of the original income subject to the tax.93 So, a U.S. citizen
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 DELoL-rE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 76, at 21.
86 Id. at 22.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 REDDEN, supra note 27, at 299.
90 DELOrTTr, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 76, at 22. "In Switzerland interest income on
bank deposits is taxable at 35% a year." Finn & Pouschine, supra note 71, at 42. The magazine was
comparing it to Luxembourg where there is no tax on interest income. This article did not take into
account the Double Tax Treaty which would permit a refund for all the Swiss tax except five percent
of the interest income.
91 DELOSTTE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 76, at 22.
92 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, U.S. - Switz., 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
93 The Report of the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to the U.S. President on June 13, 1951
stated:
In other tax conventions a complete exemption from tax on interest has been ac-
corded, upon certain conditions. In the case of the convention with Switzerland, a tax of 5
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who is not a resident of Switzerland will receive a refund for thirty per-
cent of the interest income they have received for the year.
The Swiss banking secrecy laws, which prevent the IRS from learn-
ing about the Swiss income and being able to levy taxes on it, do not
prevent the Swiss from collecting their taxes. The Swiss withhold taxes
in advance of the taxes due and in about the amount that the taxpayer
will be liable.
VI. WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES TO DO?
If the United States did not have a Double Tax Treaty with Switzer-
land, the Swiss would tax interest income of U.S. citizens earned in Swiss
banks at a rate of thirty-five percent.94 Since this rate of thirty-five per-
cent exceeds the U.S. tax rate of twenty-eight percent95 a U.S. citizen
would receive a foreign tax credit to the extent of the twenty-eight per-
cent U.S. tax liability. The U.S. citizen would not have to pay the IRS
any additional taxes on the income. Unfortunately, the U.S. citizen
would not be able to receive any extra tax credit for the seven percent tax
paid to Switzerland in excess of the equivalent tax due to the U.S.
government.
The actual effect of the Double Tax Treaty, in combination with
Swiss banking secrecy, is to limit the income tax the U.S. citizen has to
pay the Swiss government without providing any additional revenue to
the U.S. Government. The United States should amend this treaty so the
Swiss will only have to refund part of the anticipatory tax, if the Swiss
can document that the U.S. citizen is paying U.S. taxes on the Swiss
income. The Double Tax Treaty could state that a refund of the part of
the anticipatory tax (to thirty percent of the interest income) will be
granted only after the U.S. resident: 1) provides documentation proving
the income has been reported to the IRS or 2) when the depositor signs a
waiver allowing the Swiss Government to report the taxes collected to
the IRS.96 If the depositor elects not to report it to the IRS,97 the United
percent is retained because of the fact that in Switzerland there is imposed on interest, in
addition to the income tax, a 5-percent coupon or stamp tax.
See also, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 78, at 708.
This compromise by Switzerland and the United States, to permit the Swiss to collect a five
percent tax when other treaties do not permit any tax, demonstrates a willingness of the two coun-
tries to compromise to each other's interests.
94 DELOITrE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 76, at 22.
95 I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
96 As a result of the MOU, the Swiss banks currently have their customers sign a waiver which
permits the bank to release the name of their customer in an insider trading investigation.
97 When a U.S. taxpayer completes a "1040 Income tax form", if interest is earned in excess of
$400.00 a "Schedule B" must be attached. Line 10 in schedule B asks if"At any time during the tax
year, did you have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a
foreign country?" If you answer "yes" then you must complete a "Form TD F 90-22.1". The TD F
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States should not require Switzerland by treaty to reduce the normal
thirty-five percent Swiss tax they would levy on the income.
As a result of the 1986 U.S. Income Tax Act there is now a maxi-
mum tax rate of twenty-eight percent.98 The legitimate U.S. investor
would be more likely to report the income from a Swiss bank and pay the
U.S. tax of twenty-eight percent, receiving credit for the Swiss five per-
cent tax, than to pay thirty-five percent to the Swiss.
The Double Tax Treaty could also be amended to contain a provi-
sion which would require the Swiss to provide the IRS documentary evi-
dence in tax evasion cases. Once the Double Tax Treaty grants a U.S.
citizen a Swiss tax refund only when the U.S. citizen is paying U.S. taxes
on the income, the only tax evasion cases will be persons who have de-
frauded the Swiss government by receiving a refund on the Swiss tax
(e.g., lied to the Swiss government by telling the Swiss that the income
was reported to the IRS) and then have not reported the income to the
United States.
The current Treaty expressly requires the FTA to provide informa-
tion to the IRS. The treaty does not provide for "documentary" evi-
dence which could be used in the U.S. court system in a criminal tax
proceeding.99 The United States could give insurance to the Swiss that
they will not be going on any "fishing expeditions" by agreeing that the
United States will only request information and evidentiary documenta-
tion from the Swiss when the IRS has initiated the request by having
pursued a tax evasion suit in the U.S. courts."°°
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions of
the Double Tax Treaty very narrowly in releasing fiscal information to
the U.S. Government. As a result of this narrow interpretation, the IRS
has been denied the evidence they needed to pursue a tax fraud case they
were investigating. 101 Interestingly, the Swiss as a party to the amend-
90-22.1 form is the "Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts". The instruction booklet on
page 23 for this form states that if "[t]he combined value of the accounts was $10,000 or less during
the whole year" you can check "no" in the box on line 10 of form 1040 and then you do not have to
answer the next part of the question, which asks you to identify the country. If you had more than
$10,000 then you must identify the country where the money is deposited. These forms were received
from the Cleveland Office of the United States Internal Revenue Service.
98 I.R.C. § 1, (1986).
99 Mullhaupt, Seeking Swiss Assistance, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 144, 147 (1986).
100 This would assume that after the Treaty is amended, documents provided by the Swiss to
the United States showing a tax refund to a U.S. citizen who did not pay taxes on that income would
be enough to initiate tax evasion proceedings.
101 This was reported by Mullhaupt (a Swiss lawyer) in Mullhaupt, supra note 99, at 147. He
noted that:
The court denied this second request [for documentary evidence], relying primarily on
three rationales. First, Article 16 of the Double Tax Treaty explicitly states that the FTA
[Swiss revenue service] is required to submit only information, not documentary evidence,
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ments in the European Convention 10 2 are now required to provide infor-
mation regarding a "fiscal offense" requested by another member country
of the European Convention, yet the Swiss court system did not read the
Double Tax Treaty broadly enough to grant a similar result.
After the Swiss Supreme Court decided the two cases which pre-
vented the IRS from acquiring evidentiary documents, the Swiss Federal
Assembly passed a statute called the International Judicial Aid in Penal
Matters ("IJAP"). This statute codifies the Swiss response that will be
granted to the United States in their tax violation investigations. 11 3 The
IJAP limits Swiss assistance into foreign investigations to cases involving
tax fraud. Cases involving simple tax violations are not considered in
this statute. 104
Tax "fraud" as defined by Swiss law is willful and intentional mas-
sive tax evasion or the use of forged "documents" in tax preparation.
Swiss law does not consider tax declaration forms to be "documents" for
the IJAP. Swiss courts have determined that a taxpayer forges "docu-
ments" when false transactions were recorded in accounting books, con-
tracts were falsified or bills were altered. 05
According to section 28 of the [IJAP], three conditions must be
met before Swiss authorities will honor a request for assistance by for-
eign tax enforcement agencies: (1) a formal request, (2) a finding of a
concomitant Swiss tax violation, and (3) a showing that the assistance
obtained will be used only in the transaction for which the information
was initially sought (the principle of speciality). The party seeking
assistance from Swiss authorities must also file the request before cer-
tain Swiss statutes of limitations have run.10 6 The [IJAP] restricts ju-
dicial aid to the collection of proof, the submission of documents, the
hearing of witnesses, and the search of persons and premises, and ex-
pressly excludes the right of seizure or attachment of funds, in line
to the IRS. Next, citing article 2(a) of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, as well as general Swiss doctrine, the court held that judicial aid in fiscal
matters is not required in the context of criminal proceedings such as the one in question.
Finally, the court reconfirmed that the Judicial Aid Treaty could be invoked only in cases
involving organized crime and thus was not applicable here....
Id. It is very important to note here that there is an error in the analysis. While it is true the Double
Taxation Treaty requires only documentary evidence, the European Convention on Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters was amended in March 1978 to not permit refusal to provide information
because of it being fiscal in nature. See supra, note 54. This amendment was written after these cases
were decided (which was 1973), but before Mullhaupt published. The rhetorical question is: if the
United States had a similar treaty with Switzerland as the current European Convention, would the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court have decided these cases the same?
102 See supra, note 54.
103 Mullhaupt, supra note 99, at 147.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 148.
106 Id. at 149.
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with general Swiss legal doctrine.10 7
To the United States it may not be important that Swiss bank ac-
count funds cannot be attached. When the IRS is required to institute a
law suit against a taxpayer they believe is evading taxes, the U.S. court
system will already have jurisdiction as to the alleged tax evader even
before the Swiss will assist in providing fiscal information. If the IRS is
able to get a judgment against the party for tax evasion, they will be able
to extend the time of imprisonment if the taxpayer does not pay the back
taxes. This ability will provide a, strong incentive for the tax evader to
either repatriate the funds or never to return to U.S. jurisdictional reach
again.
Once the U.S.-Swiss Double Tax Treaty permits Switzerland to col-
lect and retain Swiss taxes on Swiss income, the actual number of tax
evaders will be reduced to those parties who have committed other
crimes. The United States and Switzerland in the MAT"0 8 and MOU' °9
have agreements which permit bank account attachment when more seri-
ous crimes are committed.110
VII. CONCLUSION
For the United States to limit the amount of tax evasion that will be
successfully accomplished by the individual U.S. taxpayer who has in-
vested capital in Switzerland, the United States must amend its treaties.
The U.S.-Swiss Double Taxation Treaty must be relaxed so that the
Swiss government can tax a resident U.S. citizen the standard Swiss rate
of tax when the U.S. resident is not paying the U.S. taxes that are due on
that income. The U.S.-Swiss Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Treaty should include the provisions requiring a member country to re-
port "fiscal offenses", so it will be amended to be parallel to the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The Treaty
should also require the requested country to supply the appropriate evi-
dentiary documentation with the agreement that the use of this evidence
will be restricted to the immediate court proceeding for which the re-
questing government is seeking it.
The Swiss are not singularly to blame for the environment which
permits a U.S. citizen to put money into a Swiss bank and to avoid pay-
107 Id. at 151.
108 Comment, supra note 25, at 7. See supra pt. II.A.
109 Id. at 11. See supra pt. II.B.
110 Barr v. United States Dept. of Justice, 819 F.2d 25 (2nd Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals refused to grant an injunction which would have prevented the Department of
Justice from asking Switzerland to "freeze" Mr. Barr's Swiss bank accounts. Mr. Barr argued that
the "freeze" violated his constitutional rights. The Court held that Mr. Barr's constitutional rights
were not violated. Id.
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hig U.S. income tax. An agreement must be reached balancing the Swiss
interest of having a very stable financial community against the U.S. in-
terest to tax all of its citizens on all of their world wide income.
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